

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 007055
ORIGIN IO-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /015 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:IO/UNA:BJSHARP

APPROVED BY:IO/UNA:AFHOLLOWAY

-----113126 110453Z /17

P 110042Z JAN 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 007055

FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG FROM UNA

FOLLOWING REPEAT HAVANA 0031 ACTION SECSTATE INFO ADDIS ABABA,
KINSHASA, LUSAKA, MOGADISCIO, MOSCOW AND PRETORIA JAN 06.

QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 0031

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PDEV MILI XJ CU ET SO AO

SUBJ: CUBAN HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL DISCUSSES AFRICAN ISSUES

REF: HAVANA 0010

1. ON FRINGES OF DECEMBER 31 FIDEL CASTRO RECEPTION FOR CODEL
REUSS, USINT OFFICER HAD OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS AFRICAN ISSUES
WITH SECRETARY OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
OSMANY CIENFUEGOS. ALTHOUGH HE IS A HARD-LINER ON AFRICAN
AFFAIRS, CIENFUEGOS WAS FRIENDLY, THOUGH UNBENDING, THROUGHOUT.
CIENFUEGOS MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS, WHICH SHOULD BE READ IN
CONJUNCTION WITH REFTEL REPORT ON CODEL.

2. CASTRO'S DECEMBER 24 PODER POPULAR SPEECH (HAVANA 945 NOTAL)
WAS INTENDED TO HAVE BEEN EVENHANDED TOWARD US. BUT USG STATE-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 007055

ENTS ON CUBAN AFRICAN POLICY HAD INFURIATED CASTRO (IMPLICA-
TION WAS CLEARLY THAT HE HAD THUS OVERREACTED EMOTIONALLY.)
CUBANS CANNOT ACCEPT "CONDITIONS" ON RELATIONS WITH US, PARTIC-
ULARLY ON ISSUES SUCH AS AFRICA THAT DO NOT TOUCH UNITED STATES
DIRECTLY. SUCH "CONDITIONS" PLACE CUBANS IN A POSITION OF
INEQUALITY SINCE ACTIONS WHICH ARE PERMITTED FOR US-OVERSEAS
STATIONING OF TROOPS-ARE PROSCRIBED FOR CUBANS. CUBAN

LEADERSHIP IS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE ON THIS POINT SINCE IT APPEARS TO BE AN EXAMPLE OF US "LOOKING DOWN" ON CUBA. (COMMENT: IN ADDITION TO INEQUALITY THEME, CASTRO IN DECEMBER 24 SPEECH ALSO BROUGHT UP RACISM ISSUE, CLAIMING THAT HISPANICS IN US ARE "LOOKED DOWN" UPON.)

3. TURNING TO ANGOLA, CIENFUEGOS SAID THAT UNITA, AT PRESENT TIME, DOES NOT REPRESENT SUBSTANTIAL THREAT. PRINCIPAL MISSION OF CUBAN FORCES NOW IS TO TRAIN ANGOLAN ARMY (FAPLA), NOT TO ENGAGE IN OPERATIONS. CUBANS CANNOT GUARANTEE, HOWEVER, THAT CUBAN FORCES' MISSION WILL NOT GIVE GREATER WEIGHT TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AT FUTURE DATE, IF UNITA THREAT INCREASES. FOR THIS REASON, AND DUE TO CONSIDERATIONS OF "PRINCIPLE" (CITED IN PARA 2), CUBANS CANNOT PROVIDE ASSURANCES TO US ON CHANGE IN MISSION OF CUBAN FORCES IN ANGOLA. (COMMENT: CONTRARY TO LATEST USG INFORMATION, TWO RESPONSIBLE CUBAN OFFICIALS - NATIONAL BANK VICE-PRESIDENT RODRIGUEZ AND DIRECTOR OF INSTITUTE OF INTERNAL DEMAND RODRIGUEZ BALARI - ASSERTED TO USINT OFFICER, ON SEPARATE OCCASIONS IN LAST WEEK OF DECEMBER, THAT CUBAN FORCES IN ANGOLA ARE NOW RESTRICTING THEMSELVES STRICTLY TO TRAINING FAPLA AND ARE NOT ENGAGING IN OPERATIONS - "A LESSON LEARNED FROM VIETNAM". WHEN USINT OFFICER EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM AND SAID US WOULD WELCOME HEARING ABOUT THIS CHANGE IN MISSION, PERHAPS IN CONNECTION WITH UPCOMING VISIT OF CODEL REUSS, RODRIGUEZ

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 007055

BALARI SAID CASTRO WOULD BE INFORMED OF POSSIBLE, CODEL INTEREST. CIENFUEGOS, ON DECEMBER 31, SAID THAT RODRIGUEZ BALARI MESSAGE HAD BEEN PASSED TO CASTRO. CASTRO, HOWEVER, MADE NO MENTION TO CODEL OF ANY CHANGE IN MISSION, COMPOSITION, OR SIZE OF CUBAN FORCES IN ANGOLA OR ANYWHERE ELSE IN AFRICA.)

4. NOTE: GRANMA, JANUARY 5, REPORTS NETO JANUARY 4 STATEMENTS TO LUANDA DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN WHICH HE SAYS CUBANS WILL REMAIN IN ANGOLA UNTIL "ANGOLANS ARE CAPABLE OF HANDLING BY THEMSELVES ALONE THE TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT THAT A MODERN ARMY SHOULD HAVE AT ITS DISPOSAL." NETO ALSO COMPLAINS ABOUT INCURSIONS BY TERRORIST BANDS IN SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN BORDER REGIONS. HE ALSO SAYS THAT ZAIRE AIRCRAFT ARE BOMBING UNDEFENDED ANGOLAN CIVILIAN VILLAGES AND SOUTH AFRICAN AIRCRAFT ARE BOMBING VILLAGES IN SOUTHERN CUNENE PROVINCE. END NOTE)

5. ON ETHIOPIA, CIENFUEGOS SAID THAT CUBANS COULD NOT GIVE ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD NOT OVERTAKE OGADEN COMBAT ROLE, EVEN IF SOMALIS STOPPED AT HARAR. CIENFUEGOS STATED THAT DANGER OF IRANIAN OR SAUDI ARABIAN INTERVENTION

EXISTS AND SAID CUBANS BELIEVE THAT, IN CONTRAST TO ERITREA, "POLITICAL" RATHER THAN "RELIGIOUS SOLIDARITY" MOTIVES ARE PLAYING MAJOR ROLE IN DETERMINING POSTURE OF SUCH OUTSIDE POWERS ON OGADEN ISSUE. (COMMENT: CIENFUEGOS' CRYPTIC COMMENT MAY INDICATE THAT GOC IMPLICITLY IS DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN ERITREAN AND OGADEN SITUATIONS. ACCEPTING POSITION OF "PROGRESSIVE" ARABS, SUCH AS SYRIA AND IRAQ, WHO SUPPORT ERITREAN SECESSION AND OPPOSING CONSERVATIVE POWERS, SUCH AS IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA, WHO CUBANS CLAIM ARE PROVIDING ARMS TO BACK SOMALI OGADEN THRUST. CUBANS MAY BELIEVE THAT OGADEN INTRUSION - PARTICULARLY IF PENETRATION EXTENDS MUCH BEYOND SOMALI ETHNIC AREA - IS EFFORT AIMED AT OVERTHROW OF MENGISTU REGIME, CASTRO'S REFTTEL STATMENT THAT SUC-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 007055

CESSFUL SOMALI EFFORT TO CUT-OFF ETHIOPIAN ACCESS TO SEA WOULD BE "INTOLERABLE" SUGGESTS THAT CUBANS ARE CONCERNED THAT SOMALIS WILL PUSH BEYOND HARAR TO CUT OFF DJIBOUTI RAIL OUTLET AND THEREBY CHOKE OFF ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN COMMERCE.)

6. CIENFUEGOS CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT, DUE TO FACT THAT IT APPEARS THAT THERE IS "GROUP OF PEOPLE AROUND CARTER" WHO WANT TO WAGE "CAMPAIGN" AGAINST CUBAN AFRICAN POLICY, PROCESS OF US-CUBAN NORMALIZATION WOULD BE LONG ONE.

7. COMMENT: CIENFUEGOS' COMPLAINTS ABOUT US POLICY WERE DELIVERED WITH EQUANIMITY, NOT DEFIANCE. CUBANS APPARENTLY HAVE DECIDED TO TAKE LINE THAT, WHILE THEY REMAIN INTERESTED, THERE IS NO RUSH TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH US. CASTRO TOLD CODEL REUSS NORMALIZATION WILL TAKE "TIME, PATIENCE, AND GOOD WILL." CUBANS MAY HOPE THAT WITH PASSAGE OF TIME US WILL BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO POSSIBLY MORE CIVILIAN-ORIENTED CUBAN PRESENCE IN AFRICA. CUBAN SANG-FROID IS PRESUMABLY FORTIFIED BY CONFIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE SECURED, OR WILL SECURE, FAVORABLE ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION FOR 1978 AND PERHAPS, FOR THE 1981-86 PERIOD. ACCESS TO US MARKET THUS WOULD BECOME LESS NECESSARY. LANE
UNQUOTE VANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SITUATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 11 jan 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE007055
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: IO/UNA:BJSHARP
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780015-0823
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780173/aaaackbd.tel
Line Count: 160
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: d53c8be4-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN IO
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 HAVANA 10
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 12 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3790498
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CUBAN HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL DISCUSSES AFRICAN ISSUES
TAGS: PDEV, MILI, XJ, CU, ET, SO, AO
To: USUN NEW YORK
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/d53c8be4-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014